UK must hold Chilcot-style inquiry into Afghanistan, says Gen Lord Dannatt
BRITAIN must hold an Chilcot-style inquiry into its military campaign in Afghanistan and acknowledge strategic blunders made by Tony Blair, the former head of the army, Gen Lord Dannatt , said last night.
Lord Dannatt, who was Chief of the General Staff from 2006-2009, highlighted the decision to commit British soldiers to Helmand Province in 2006 despite warnings by generals that forces would still be heavily engaged in Iraq.
Speaking last night he said strategic miscalculations taken by Tony Blair’s government forced an under-strength military presence to change its mission from humanitarian security building through development to defending ground against underestimated opposition forces.
At the top of the miscalculation table was the decision to support an invasion of Iraq when the UK was already committed to Afghanistan, Blair’s own 1998 defence review had allowed for the British Army to undertake only one enduring operation at a time, he said.
Other problems included ignoring intelligence advice that the Taliban would present a formidable enemy and the sacking of corrupt Helmand governor Sher Mohammed Akhundzada in 2005.
Akhundzada later boasted that he turned his personal 3,000-strong militia over to the Taliban.
“I don’t think anyone would argue with the rightness of the UK supporting the US in sweeping out the Taliban who were sheltering Al Qaeda in 2001, and this was done well by mid-2002,” said Lord Dannatt last night.
“But any hope that the US would lead an effort to put in place a regime in Kabul to govern that country well were swept away by its decision to go back into Iraq. This was a strategic error of biblical proportions, as we all know now.”
Having committed 10,000 troops to Iraq, Tony Blair then offered in 2004 to lead a Nato mission in southern Afghanistan in 2006.
“As planning for the new operation in Afghanistan developed, it was against a background of a major deployment in Iraq which was expected to come down,“ said Lord Dannatt.
Lord Dannatt said hopes that the Taliban would be discouraged after the first proper military engagement, the Battle of Nawzad - in which coalition forces suffered few casualties compared with 680 Taliban deaths - were soon dashed.
“They had tested our resolve, found us pretty feisty and the hope was then that they would decide it wasn’t worth the candle and tolerate us. Not a bit of it,” he said.
When Taliban insurgents. began to take over district centres in Sangin, Musa Qaleh and elsewhere President Karzai ordered them to be defended by British forces.
“At that moment our mission changed from being a humanitarian one , building security through development on an ink spot basis, to defending ground.This set the tone for the rest of the campaign.”
He added: “My frustration as CGS was trying to get Tony Blair and (defence secretary) Des Browne to understand that we needed more resources.
“In 2006 we were haemorrhaging manpower as corporals and sergeants and junior captains left, their families saying they’d had enough. The army was running hot, like an engine without oil.
“Des Browne didn’t get it, Blair didn’t want to get it, and Gordon Brown did not get it either until 2009, by which stage the US had begun to come to our rescue again with a sizable deployment of marines.”
Last month current CGS Gen Sir Nick Carter dismissed suggestions for an inquiry into Afghanistan because, unlike Iraq, there were no suggestions it wasn’t a “just war”.
But Lord Dannatt said: “We need an inquiry because all these things start from the top.
“If your strategic calculation and analysis is deficient you come up with wrong strategic objectives and plan a campaign that is doomed to be somewhere between suboptimal and a failure.
“We got out strategic thinking wrong. We agreed to go into Iraq instead of staying in Afghanistan. We offered to lead a new operation in Afghanistan 2006 when we were still deep in the mire in Iraq.’
He added: “I have a lot of time for Nick (Carter), and he and I generally agree on things. I’m a little surprised that he has said there’s no need for an inquiry and I think he has been under some political pressure.
“It is difficult to fathom why this Conservative government isn’t keen to hold in inquiry when the key strategic design which, in my view, were faulty, were taken when the Labour Party was in government.
“The die was already cast by the time David Cameron became PM in 2010. “