Ukraine faces the most difficult winter yet of Putin's war – now is the time to hit Russia

Kira Rudik - Leader of Golos party

Kira Rudik - Leader of Golos party (Image: Flickr)

Pain points: Ukrainian energy versus Russian assets

Over the past 27 months, Ukrainian cities have been filled with sounds that were once new to us and which, unfortunately, we have already gotten used to: the howling of an air-raid siren, the whistling of a cruise missile, the buzzing of a kamikaze drone and explosions — muffled if it is far away or the air defence is working, and deafening if it is very close. Since May of this year, a new sound has been added — generators. Their roar is now a sign of life and the ability to work because electricity has become a luxury for us.

Energy as a compulsion to surrender

Russia began a new wave of massive missile terror against the energy infrastructure of Ukraine on March 22, 2024. Ukraine's largest hydroelectric power station — DniproHES — was hit, and the Trypilska thermal power plant, which supplied electricity to Kyiv, Cherkasy, and Zhytomyr regions, was destroyed. Zmiivska TPP and Kharkiv TPP-5, which powered Kharkiv. The Ladyzhyn TPP in the Vinnytsia Region and the Burshtyn TPP in the Lviv Region were seriously damaged. The enemy targeted the Sumy CHP plant with guided aerial bombs. The Russians also targeted the Kaniv HPP in Cherkasy Oblast and the Dnistrovsk HPP in the Chernivtsi region. This terror continues to this day.

Since the spring, Russia has already destroyed 9 GW of power, 80% of thermal generation, and a third of hydrogen generation. According to NPC "Ukrenergo", the need for preparing the energy industry of Ukraine for winter may amount to about 1.5 billion dollars. For full recovery of power plants and high-voltage infrastructure, the energy system will need much more — dozens of billions of dollars.

Behind these numbers is total darkness. And it's not about candlelight romance, it's about danger and survival.

What does it mean to live in a big city during a full-scale war without electricity? In most of our high-rise buildings, the heating and water supply depends on electricity — if there is no electricity, there is no water, sewage, and heat. Mobile communications, the Internet, the subway, and electric transport also do not work. You can find out about the air alarm only from the vehicles of the State Emergency Service or the police.

Imagine you are a mother with a small child who lives above the 10th floor. You hear an alarm and you have to save your child and yourself. How will you go down on foot with a stroller to at least the parking lot, which serves as a shelter? And what if it is a ballistic missile and every minute counts?

We are preparing for a winter that we know will probably be the most difficult of the full-scale invasion. We install solar panels on high-rise buildings, buy equipment, repair generation, and equip underground schools for children. But we can't do it ourselves. We need protection, we need to disable the enemy, and we need a resource to recover.

Protection

Like two years ago, Ukraine is in critical need of protecting its skies. No city on the territory of our state, no matter how far from the front line it is, is not safe. Missiles and drones fly everywhere and hit infrastructure and people's homes. That's why we desperately require air defense systems and on every site at every opportunity we emphasize this. After all, what kind of reconstruction can we talk about when they hit the same buildings again?

In some places, the best defence against a Russian missile is to destroy its launch site, so permission to use partner-provided weapons on the enemy territory is critical. And not only in the front-line zone.

Depriving the enemy of potential

Sanction pressure on the Russian federation is unprecedented, but it has drawbacks. First, each new package of restrictions was introduced too late and this gave the aggressor time to adjust to the new conditions. Secondly, Russia finds loopholes to circumvent sanctions through third countries and intermediary companies. This is a known fact, but the criminalization of sanctions evasion is just as slow.

The military machine of the Russian Federation is still heavily dependent on Western technologies and finds ways to obtain them. The National Agency of Ukraine for Prevention of Corruption introduced an open database of foreign components used in Russian and Iranian weapons. Therefore, there is a need for strict control of dual-purpose goods and punishment for violation of the sanctions regime.

In early June, the United States announced an expansion of the list of sanctions against the Russian Federation and added more than 30 individuals and more than 200 legal entities to it. In particular, sanctions were imposed on the National Clearing Center and the Moscow Stock Exchange. As a result, shares on the Moscow Exchange fell by 15%, the exchange rate of the dollar and euro against the ruble reached new records, queues lined up at money changers, and banks began to block deposits from Russians. It was an excellent signal to the Kremlin and its fanatics in the Russian Federation about what a price war can have. But there should be more such signals and they should be more powerful.

The exit of Western companies from the Russian Federation is no less important because it looks somewhat cynical when a conditional partner country allocates funds for the reconstruction of a Ukrainian school destroyed by Russia, even though the business of this country paid the Russian Federation the taxes that were used to build this missile. And there are almost 1,700 such companies that still work in the Russian Federation. At the same time, about 140 suspended investments, 390 reduced their activities, 700 suspended their activities, and 522 left the market. And only 397 left completely.

It is not easy to take business out of Russia now, but it is important. Assets blocked by the aggressor can then be returned through future reparations. This is a difficult and long road, but it will not begin as long as Western business feeds the budget of the Russian federation and it can continue the war.

A resource for the recovery of Ukraine

Leaders of the G7 countries recorded that Russia should pay Ukraine 486 billion dollars for the damage caused. And these funds are there — they are frozen Russian assets in democratic states. Now it is known that they amount to about 500 billion. But it can be much more because there are still funds of the aggressor that are not publicly known for one reason or another.

The transfer of blocked Russian assets to Ukraine is a complex issue that we have been working on for two years and already have a result. At the G7 summit, it was agreed to provide a loan of 50 billion dollars, which will be repaid at the expense of profits from such assets. This is a historic decision, but only the first step.

Ukraine must receive all frozen Russian funds — both private and sovereign. This is absolutely reasonable: why should the taxpayers of the partner countries rebuild what was destroyed by the aggressor, if these funds are already available? Why does the Kremlin still have the tool of blackmail and pressure, if it can be deprived of this tool? Most importantly, the confiscation of these funds (especially the assets of the Central Bank of the Russian federation) is a clear signal to other dictatorial regimes in the world that no crime remains with impunity

Russia has chosen Ukrainian energy as a target for its terror to break Ukrainians. This did not work for the enemy in the winter of 2022-23 and will not work now. But this target is painful and it costs us effort to resist. However, we know that the most painful thing for the aggressor is the question of their money. So why can't we strike this really tangible blow at the Kremlin together?

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